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INTRODUCTION

As a general rule, Texas law traditionally has required a
claimant to possess a common law or a statutory right of action, or in
public rights cases, to have a personal interest in the enforcement of
the public right distinct from and more palpable than the general
public's interest before commencing a civil action.' Beginning with
the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Texas Ass'n of Business v.
Texas Air Control Board, a majority of the Texas Supreme Court
appears to have replaced these traditional ideas with federal standing
doctrine and to have elevated the law of standing to jurisdictional
status. The court's new approach to standing complicates Texas
* Chief Justice John and Lena Hickman Distinguished Faculty Fellow and
Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, Dallas,
Texas. Many helpful comments and suggestions were provided by Lonny S.
Hoffman, Jeffrey Kahn, Beth Thomburg, and several of my other colleagues who
reviewed prior drafts of the article. Special thanks to Gregory Ivy, who conducted
an intensive investigation into the mysterious origin of Texas's second capacity
defense. I also want to recognize the diligent and careful assistance provided by
my principal research assistant, Corinna Chandler.
1. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
2. 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex. 1993) ("We therefore hold that standing,
as a component of subject matter jurisdiction, cannot be waived in this or any other
case and may be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the court.");
see id. at 444-46 (using federal standing doctrine as a guideline to standing in
Texas, noting that "we look to the more extensive jurisprudential experience of the
federal courts on [standing] for any guidance it may yield"); see also
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008) ("A court has
no jurisdiction over a claim by a plaintiff without standing to assert it.").
A lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution, which limits federal
judicial power to the resolution of "Cases" and "Controversies," deprives a court
of subject matter jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
559-62, 569 n.4 (1992) (discussing the requirement of standing under Article III).
Prudential standing limitations recognized by the Supreme Court, as opposed to
Article III standing limitations, are not regarded as jurisdictional because these are

36
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law

by embracing

a complex

body

of federal

constitutional law 3 without clearly explaining whether a claimant
must possess a legal injury resulting from the breach of a legal duty,
or whether some other type of interest or injury is sufficient to satisfy
Texas's standing requirements. 4

not considered to be imposed by Article III's "Case" or "Controversy"
requirement. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12
(2004) (comparing Article III standing and prudential standing).
Recently, for the first time, the Texas Supreme Court expressly recognized
that federal standing doctrine has both prudential and jurisdictional components
and stated that "[t]his Court has not indicated whether standing is always a matter
of subject-matter jurisdiction." Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 51
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1258, 1262 n.16 (Tex. 2008) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 750-52 (1984)).
3. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.) ("We need not mince words
when we say that the concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with
complete consistency.... ."); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1988) ("One of the
traditional criticisms of [federal] standing law is that it is confusing and seemingly
incoherent."); see also Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract- 109177
(discussing the failure of the federal standing doctrine to "promote the very
principles that are said to justify its existence"); William A. Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221, 221 (1988) (proposing abandonment of the current
structure of standing law, which has been described as incoherent, in favor of
treating standing as a question on the merits of plaintiff's claim).
4. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 ("The general test for standing
in Texas requires that there '(a) shall be a real controversy between the parties,
which (b) will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought."' (quoting
Bd. of Water Eng'rs v. City of San Antonio, 155 Tex. 111, 114, 283 S.W.2d 722,
724 (1955))). The "general test" set forth in Texas Ass'n of Business, and taken
from Board of Water Engineers, gives incomplete guidance in that it does not
clarify what type of injury or interest, if any, is needed for a plaintiff to have
standing. In Board of Water Engineers, which concerned a statute's constitutionality and the prohibition against the issuance of advisory opinions, there was
no discussion of the type of interest claimants must possess to have standing. A
recent opinion concerning the standing of class representatives explains that the
injury must be "concrete" and "particularized" as well as "actual" or "imminent,"
but it is still unclear whether a legal injury is required or if, for instance, an injury
in fact is sufficient. See DaimlerChryslerCorp., 252 S.W.3d at 304-05 ("[T]he
law is not well developed on the degree to which the defect must actually manifest
itself before it is actionable.").
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Another troublesome byproduct of the court's 1993 decision
in Texas Ass'n of Business involves Texas's capacity defenses. 5
Texas Supreme Court decisions prior to Texas Ass'n of Business
treated the concepts of capacity and standing as essentially synonymous. 6 This is no longer possible after Texas Ass 'n of Business. The
elevation of standing to a jurisdictional doctrine requires a clear line
of demarcation between the doctrines of capacity and standing. No
such line has been established; instead, Texas appellate decisions
exhibit incoherence and confusion.
This Article examines federal and Texas standing doctrine
and makes recommendations for the principled application of the
traditional nonjurisdictional approach of the procedural defense of
standing under Texas law for common law claims and statutory
rights of action and for the concomitant restriction of the
jurisdictional aspects of standing to litigation brought by private
persons and governmental units to enforce public rights or compel
the performance of public duties. This Article also explains how the
concepts of standing and capacity can be reconciled and harmonized.
II.

FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE

Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the
federal courts to the resolution of "Cases" and "Controversies." 7
Those two words currently impose a number of limits on the exercise
of judicial power by eliminating some important disputes from the
federal judicial sphere. Thus, as the Supreme Court recently summarized in Massachusetts v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency:
[N]o justiciable "controversy" exists when parties
seek adjudication of a political question, when they
ask for an advisory opinion, or when the question
5. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(1) ("That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue
or that the defendant has not legal capacity to be sued."); R. 93(2) ("That the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover in the capacity in which he sues, or that the
defendant is not liable in the capacity in which he is sued.").
6. See Light v. Wilson, 663 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. 1983) (defining capacity
to sue as a party's "standing to assert or defend the action before the Court"
(emphasis added)); Conrad v. Artha Garza Co., 615 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (treating capacity and standing as synonymous).
7. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2.
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has been mooted by
sought to be adjudicated
8
subsequent developments.
In addition, "[t]he rules of standing.., are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention. It is the responsibility
of the complainant clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a
of the dispute and the
proper party to invoke judicial resolution
9
exercise of the court's remedial powers."
In other words, the rules of standing determine whether a
litigant has the right type of interest to maintain an action in federal
court. Constitutional standing is "one of the controlling elements in
the definition of a case or controversy under Article III. ' ' 1° Under
federal law, a lack of Article III standing deprives a court of subject
matter jurisdiction.' 1
The fundamental requirement that claimants must have
standing is not a mere pleading rule. As Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife explains:
[The elements of standing] are not mere pleading
requirements but rather an indispensable part of the
plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the
same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff
has the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and
degree of evidence required at the successive stages
of the litigation.12
Under current federal law, constitutional standing requires
that a "plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particula8. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1452 (2007) (citations omitted). The timeliness, or
"ripeness," of an action is also constitutionally significant. For example, the ripeness requirement bars courts from considering issues prematurely, such as before
an act or statute being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the person
making the challenge. See Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior,
538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003); Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49
(1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105

(1977).
9.
10.
11.
12.

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975).
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62, 569 n.4 (1992).
Id. at 561.
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rized, and (b) 'actual or imminent,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."",13 Additionally, "there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of' and "it must be 'likely'
...

that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."14

In Lujan, the Supreme Court held that certain organizations
dedicated to wildlife conservation and other environmental causes
did not have Article III standing to challenge a rule promulgated by
the Secretary of the Interior interpreting a section of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973.'5 The rule interpreted the statute as requiring
federal agencies to consult with the Secretary only for actions taken
in the United States or on the high seas, but not for actions taken in
foreign nations. 16 The Court held that the plaintiffs were not among
the injured merely because they had toured foreign regions in which
federally funded projects threatened the habitats of Egyptian
crocodiles and Sri Lankan elephants, and planned to return as
tourists to the places they had visited previously at some time in the
future. 17 "Such 'some day' intentions-without any description of
concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
day will be--do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent'
injury that our cases require."' 8 The Court went on to note the
following:
Standing is not "an ingenious academic exercise in
the conceivable,"

but ...

requires ...

a factual

showing of perceptible harm. It is clear that the
person who observes or works with a particular
animal threatened by a federal decision is facing
perceptible harm, since the very subject of his interest
will no longer exist ....

It goes beyond the limit,

however, and into pure speculation and fantasy, to say
that anyone who observes or works with an endangered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably
harmed by a single project affecting some portion of
13. Id. at 560.
14. Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
15. Id. at 557-59, 578.
16. Id. at 558-59.

17. Id. at 562-64.
18. Id. at 564; see also id. at 564 n.2 ("Although 'imminence' is concededly a
somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to
ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes .... ).
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that species1 9 with which he has no more specific
connection.
In contrast, in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency, the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts had standing to
challenge the Environmental Protection Agency's denial of a petition
to begin regulating the emission of greenhouse gases, including
carbon dioxide, under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act because the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a sovereign state and not, as the
appellees in Lujan, a private individual.2 ° Specifically, the Court
found that Massachusetts "owns a substantial portion of the state's
coastal property" that will be permanently or temporarily lost
through storm surge and flooding if sea levels continue to rise as
predicted, and as such Massachusetts "has alleged a particularized
injury in its capacity as a landowner." 21 The Court also noted that
the fact "[t]hat these climate-change risks are 'widely shared' does
not minimize
Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of this
22
litigation.

The injury-in-fact component of Article III standing is
relatively new.23 Although the Supreme Court long ago recognized
that adviso 7 opinions are outside the federal jurisdictional limits of
Article III, the injury-in-fact requirement is rooted in the Supreme
Court's 1970 decision in Ass'n of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp.25 In Camp, the Court replaced the traditional notion that a person was required to have a cause of action-or
an injury in law-with the considerably more lenient, but
nonetheless abstract, idea that the claimant was required to have
sustained an injury in fact.26

19. Id. at 566-67.
20. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454 (2007).

21. Id.
at 1455-56.
22. Id.at 1456. Another line of standing cases holds that the interests of
federal taxpayers who seek to enjoin the unlawful expenditure of tax revenue are
considered to be too generalized to authorize taxpayer standing. See Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 476-79 (discussing Supreme Court decisions regarding taxpayer standing).
23. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
24. Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792).
25. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
26. See id. at 152 ("The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.").
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The injury-in-fact standard is described in broad terms. Not
only is it distinct from the "legal interest" test, which "goes to the
merits," an injury in fact "may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and
recreational' as well as economic values. 27 In other words, the
injury-in-fact test is not moored to the concepts of "legal interest,"
"legal injury," or "legally cognizable claims."
In addition to constitutional limits on the exercise of judicial
power, the Supreme Court has traditionally recognized prudential
standing limitations, barring many third-party suits, 2 8 preventing

plaintiffs from prosecuting suits for generalized grievances shared
with other members of the public generally, 29 and requiring plaintiffs
to be within the "zone of interests" that the relevant statute or
governmental regulation seeks to protect.
The line between prudential standing and constitutional standing limitations under federal
27. Id. at 153-54; see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-17
(1972) ("Recent decisions by this Court have greatly expanded the types of
'personal stake(s)' which are capable of conferring standing on a potential
plaintiff.").
28. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (holding that doctor
had no standing to challenge statute on ground that its enforcement would harm
patients); cf United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown
Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1996) (discussing "wide variety of...
contexts in which a statute, federal rule, or accepted common-law practice permits
one person to sue on behalf of another, even where damages are sought"). See
generally Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277
(1984) (discussing judicial views on third-party standing).
29. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998) (noting that the
"generalized grievance" limit on standing "invariably appears in cases where the
harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite
nature-for example, harm to the 'common concern for obedience to law"'); see
also, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343-46 (2006) (denying
taxpayers standing to challenge granting of local and state tax credits); Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209-11, 217-20 (1974)
(holding that present and former members of the Reserves who challenged
members of Congress as violating Constitution by simultaneously belonging to
Congress and the Reserves had no standing because same interest was shared by
all citizens); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923) (denying
taxpayer standing to sue to enjoin expenditure of funds). But see Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (holding that taxpayer had standing to challenge
expenditure because "the Establishment Clause ...

specifically limit[s] the taxing

and spending power conferred by Art. I, [§] 8").
30. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 130, 153 (1970)).
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law is a hazy one, especially in the context of generalized grievances. Under the most recent Supreme Court case law, it is probable
that a generalized grievance about governmental action cannot
satisfy the basic inj*ury-in-fact requirement because it is not concrete
and particularized. In contrast, governmental action that is directed
at a large group of citizens arguably could cause each of them an
injury in fact.32 Unlike constitutional standing, prudential standing is
not an element of federal subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, an
appellate court can ignore the prudential standing argument if it is
raised for
the first time on appeal and instead decide the case on the
33
merits.
The apparently contemplated adoption of federal prudential
standing doctrine by the Texas Supreme Court34 will avoid some of
the procedural difficulties that jurisdictional standing rules create,35
but it will not reconcile traditional legal interest standing jurisprudence with the jurisdictional branch of federal standing doctrine.
31. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 204 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] 'generalized grievance' that
affects the entire citizenry cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement even
though it aggrieves the plaintiff along with everyone else . . . ." (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992))); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 91 n.166 (3d
ed. 2006) ("[T]he ban on citizen standing is constitutional not prudential." (citing
Lujan, 504 U.S. 555)).
32. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62 ("When the suit is one challenging the legality
of government action or inaction... standing depends considerably upon whether
the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or foregone action) at issue. If he is,
there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury,
and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When,
however, ... a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly
unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is
needed."); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 91 ("[T]he bar against
generalized grievance standing is inapplicable if a person claims that he or she has
been denied freedom of speech or due process, even if everyone else in society has
suffered the same harm. However, if the plaintiff alleges a violation of no specific
constitutional right, but instead claims an interest only as a taxpayer or a citizen in
having the government follow the law, standing is not allowed."); Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 894 (1983) ("[W]hen an individual who is the very
object of a law's requirement or prohibition seeks to challenge it, he always has
standing.").
33. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007).
34. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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Further, it is clear that although adoption of the federal concept of
prudential standing may be helpful, the adoption of its complex and
uncertain details will cause additional procedural difficulties.

III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEXAS STANDING DOCTRINE

Although there is no "Case" or "Controversy" provision in
the Texas Constitution as there is in Article III of the United States
Constitution, Texas courts have long recognized constitutional limits
on the exercise of judicial power established by the Texas
Constitution. One of the primary limits on the exercise of judicial
power is the prohibition against the rendition of advisory opinions.
It has been repeatedly held that Article 5, § 8 of the Texas
36
Constitution does not empower courts to render advisory opinions.
As explained by Chief Justice James W. McClendon of the Austin
Court of Appeals, "[t]he expression 'advisory opinion' ordinarily
connotes the practice that existed in England ... of extrajudicial
37

consultation of the judges by the Crown and the House of Lords."
Accordingly, one important prerequisite to the exercise of
judicial power is a requirement of a justiciable controversy-a real
controversy between the parties that actually will be resolved in the
litigation. 38 In addition, before the term "standing" was used by
Texas courts to label the type of interest or injury needed by a
claimant to bring a lawsuit,3 9 a claimant was usually required to have
36. Alamo Express, Inc. v. Union City Transfer, 158 Tex. 234, 252, 309
S.W.2d 815, 827 (1958); see also Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Burch,
442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1969) (citing Texas cases that have held that "the

judicial power does not embrace the giving of advisory opinions"), abrogated on
other grounds by Farmers Texas County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81,
83 (Tex. 1997); United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855, 859-60
(Tex. 1965) (same).
37. Douglas Oil Co. v. State (Whiteside Case), 81 S.W.2d 1064, 1075 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1935), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Fed. Royalty Co. v.
State, 128 Tex. 324, 98 S.W.2d 993 (1936).
38. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662
(Tex. 1996) (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440,
446 (Tex. 1993)).

39. Although the term "standing" appears in some earlier Texas Supreme
Court opinions, the first case that essentially treats it as a synonym for the term
"justiciable interest" is Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984) ("In order
for any person to maintain a suit it is necessary that he have standing to litigate the
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a common law cause of action or a statutory right of action. In other
words, in order to have a "justiciable interest" the claimant generally
was required to have a "legal interest"-a cause of action-and to

have sustained a legal injury as the result of the defendant's breach
of a common law or a statutory duty.4"
Texas also recognized two important exceptions to the legal
interest requirement-the public rights exception and a taxpayer

exception. Under the public rights exception, in limited circumstances, a private person is permitted to assert a public right or to
challenge a government action that neither grants a legal interest nor
legally injures the person. 4 ' In this situation, claimants are required
to have a "particular personal interest which separates them from the
general public. 4 2 The earliest Texas case to recognize and limit this
public rights exception to the legal interest rule is City of San
Antonio v. Strumberg.43 In Strumberg, the City of San Antonio
matters in issue. Standing consists of some interest peculiar to the person
individually and not as a member of the general public.").
40. See, e.g., Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1976) ("[O]nly
the person whose primary legal right has been breached may seek redress for an
injury.... Without a breach of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff no cause of
action can accrue to his benefit."); Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 35 S.W.2d 128,
131 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, judgm't adopted) ("The right to maintain an action
depends upon the existence of what is termed a cause of action, which involves the
combination of a right on the part of the plaintiff and a violation of such right by
defendant."); All Seasons Window & Door Mfg., Inc. v. Red Dot Corp., 181
S.W.3d 490, 496-97 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (plaintiff did not have
standing to sue for usury because it was not a party to the contract at issue and
"usury remedies are personal to the debtor"); Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22,
26-27 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied) (holding that plaintiff had no standing
in property damage suit against oil company because injury occurred before
plaintiff bought land and deed contained no assignment of any cause of action; in
other words, there was no breach of any legal right belonging to plaintiff).
41. See Hunt, 664 S.W.2d at 324 ("Plaintiffs have shown a particular personal
interest which separates them from the general public."); City of San Antonio v.
Strumberg, 70 Tex. 366, 368, 7 S.W. 754, 755 (Tex. 1888) ("We think it a
principle established by the overwhelming weight of authority in the courts of all
countries subject to the common law that no action lies to restrain an interference
with a mere public right, at the suit of an individual who has not suffered or is not
threatened with some damage peculiar to himself.").
42. Hunt, 664 S.W.2d at 324.
43. 70 Tex. 366, 7 S.W. 754. It is important to note that the South Western
Reporter spells the defendant's name as "Stumburg" instead of "Strumberg." The
cases are identical other than the disparate spelling of the defendant's name.
Strumberg is used throughout this Article for consistency.
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passed a resolution to erect a city hall on the Military Plaza, an open
space within the city limits. 44 Strumberg filed a suit to enjoin the
construction.4 5 Although he was a resident property owner and taxpayer, his property did not abut the plaza and he was not specially
injured by the project. 46 Based on an "elementary" doctrine derived
from a very influential secondary source, the Texas
Supreme Court
47
held that Strumberg could not maintain the action.
Another long recognized exception to the "legal interest" rule
provides that taxpayers have standing under Texas law to sue in
equity to enjoin the unlawful expenditure of public funds, without
showing a distinct interest or injury. 48 In contrast, taxpayers with no
special injury distinct from the general public do not have standing
to challenge expenditures that are merely "unwise or indiscreet, '4 9 to
sue to recover funds that have already been expended,5 ° or to
prohibit a governmental entity from paying for goods or services that1
5
the government has already received and placed in permanent use.
Further, "for prudential reasons," the Texas Supreme Court has
determined that paying sales tax does not confer taxpayer standing
because such a rule would permit virtually any person "to come' 52into
court and bring the government's actions under judicial review."
Beginning with the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals' 1976
decision in Housing Authority of Harlingen, Texas v. State ex rel.
Velasquez, 53 several Texas courts of appeals, under the influence of
developing federal standing principles, began to articulate the
following alternative requirements for a person's standing to sue:

44. Id. at 366, 7 S.W. at 754.

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 368, 7 S.W. at 755 ("We think it a principle established by the
overwhelming weight of authority in the courts of all countries subject to the
common law that no action lies to restrain an interference with a mere public right,
at the suit of an individual who has not suffered or is not threatened with some
damage peculiar to himself. As applied to public measures the doctrine is elementary." (2 Cooley's Blackstone, [122 (1884)])).

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Osborne v. Keith, 142 Tex. 262, 264-65, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (1944).
Id.
Hoffman v. Davis, 128 Tex. 503, 508, 100 S.W.2d 94, 96 (1937).
Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 556-58 (Tex. 2000).
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 180 (Tex. 2000).
539 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
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1) he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of
sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the
wrongful act of which he complains; 2) he has a direct
relationship between the alleged injury and claim
sought to be adjudicated; 3) he has a personal stake in
the controversy; 4) the challenged action has caused
the plaintiff some injury in fact, either economic,
ethic [sic], recreational, environmental, or otherwise;
or 5) he is an appropriate party to assert the public's
54
interest in the matter, as well as his own interest.
Under Velasquez and similar subsequent cases, 55 Texas
standing doctrine appears to have embraced evolving federal
standing jurisprudence, including the broad injury-in-fact standard
announced in Camp.56 Appearances, however, are sometimes deceiving. It is altogether unlikely that the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals in Velasquez, or the courts of appeals that have adopted
Velasquez's standing requirements, appreciated the significance of
the 1970 doctrinal change in federal standing law or intended to
make a similar modification of Texas law without the benefit of any
Texas 57Supreme Court decision authorizing the courts of appeals to
do SO.
Another subsisting line of Texas cases that is solidly rooted
in Texas's traditional "legal interest" jurisprudence equates standing
with the existence of a legally cognizable claim. 58 Under this ap-

54. Id. at 913-14 (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp., 397

U.S. 150 (1970)).
55. See, e.g., Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 249 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (listing five requirements for standing as first set forth
in Velasquez, 539 S.W.2d at 913-14); Polaris Indus., Inc. v. McDonald, 119
S.W.3d 331, 338 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.) (same); Precision Sheet Metal
Mfg. Co. v. Yates, 794 S.W.2d 545, 551-52 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ
denied) (same).
56. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
57. Velasquez, 539 S.W.2d at 913 (citing "legal interest" cases, for example,
Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 35 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, judgm't
adopted)).
58. See Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co., 123 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. App.Texarkana 2003, no pet.) ("Without a breach of a legal right belonging to a
plaintiff, that plaintiff has no standing to litigate."); Hicks, 35 S.W.2d at 131 ("The
right to maintain an action depends upon the existence of what is termed a cause of
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proach, "only the person whose primary legal right has been
breached may seek redress for an injury." 59 Of course, this line of
cases represents the original conception of what constitutes 6a0
justiciable interest needed by a plaintiff to prosecute a court action.
Occasionally, Texas intermediate appellate courts have insensibly
combined this traditional legal interest standard with the injury-in61
fact formulation developed and applied by the Supreme Court,
even though under federal standing doctrine an injury in 62fact need
not be a legal injury resulting from a breach of a legal duty.
The first time that the Texas Supreme Court embraced
federal standing jurisprudence was in Texas Ass'n of Business v.
Texas Air Control Board. In Texas Ass 'n of Business, the Texas
Supreme Court held that the Texas Association of Business (TAB)
had standing to seek a ruling that statutes empowering the Texas Air
Control Board and the Texas Water Control Board to levy civil
penalties for violations of their regulations were unconstitutional
under the Texas Constitution. The court based its decision on the
following findings related to the three-prong test in Hunt v.
(1) TAB
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission:64
members had standing to sue on their own behalf because individual
members had been assessed administrative penalties pursuant to the
challenged enactments; (2) the TAB was chartered to "represent the
interests of its members on issues which may impact its members'
businesses"; and (3) the TAB's claim did not require the
participation of its members because it did not need to prove any
action, which involves the combination of a right on the part of the plaintiff and a
violation of such right by defendant.").
59. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1976).
60. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Velasquez, 539 S.W.2d at 913-14 (noting that "[i]t is a

fundamental rule of law that without a breach of a legal right belonging to the
plaintiff, no cause of action arises or can accrue to his benefit" while holding that

"some injury in fact, either economic, ethic [sic], recreational, environmental, or
otherwise" is required for a plaintiff to have standing).
62. See supra notes 13-14, 23-27 and accompanying text.
63. 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993).

64. 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) ("[W]e have recognized that an association has
standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit.").
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individual circumstances of its members in 65that it sought only
prospective relief and raised only issues of law.
Although the recognition of "associational standing" based
on federal standing doctrine itself did no harm to Texas
jurisprudence in the context in which Texas Ass 'n of Business arose,
namely because it fit nicely into the public rights exception, 66 the
majority opinion nevertheless created several serious problems.
First, the opinion, written by then-Justice John Comyn, vaguely
states that both federal and Texas standing doctrine require the
claimant to have suffered an injury but does not clearly describe the
kind of injury that is required.67 There is an implication that the
68
Texas Supreme Court embraced federal standing principles,
including the type of injury needed, but the "general test" for
standing articulated by the court avoids explicitly doing so because
the opinion rests largely on traditional Texas jurisprudence applied
in public rights cases. 69 Second, the court held that because standing
is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived
and may be raised for the first time on appeal. 70 This holding, which
rests on the court's interpretation of the separation of powers and the
open courts provisions of the Texas Constitution,7 1 expressly
overruled previous Texas case law, which held that lack of standing
must be asserted by the opposing party in the trial court in order to
In
preserve error and avoid waiving the standing issue. 72
65. Tex. Ass 'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 447-48.
66. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
67. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 ("To comport with Article III, a
federal court may hear a case only when the litigant has been threatened with or
has sustained an injury. Under the Texas Constitution, standing is implicit in the
open courts provision, which contemplates access to the courts only for those
litigants suffering an injury." (citation omitted)).
68. Id. ("Because standing is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a
suit under both federal and Texas law, we look to the more extensive
jurisprudential experience of the federal courts on this subject for any guidance it
may yield.").
69. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
70. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445-46.
71. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; id. art. I, § 13.
72. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 ("We are aware that this holding
conflicts with Texas Industrial Traffic League v. Railroad Commission, 633
S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam). The analysis that leads us to the conclusion we reach here, however, compels us to overrule Texas Industrial Traffic
League and disapprove of all cases relying on it to the extent that they conflict
with this opinion.").
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combination, these two holdings have spawned an increasing use of
jurisdictional standing doctrine to cover cases in which plaintiffs
simply do not have or cannot prove legally cognizable claims.
According to Justice Comyn's opinion, Texas Industrial
Traffic League, and all cases relying on it, were overruled because of
three undesirable consequences that could result from the inability to
raise standing for the first time on appeal:
First and foremost, appellate courts would be
impotent to prevent lower courts from exceeding their
constitutional and statutory limits of authority.
Second, appellate courts could not arrest collusive
suits. Third, by operation of the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, judgments rendered
in suits addressing only hypothetical injuries could
bar relitigation of issues by a litigant who eventually
suffers an actual injury.73
In retrospect, it is difficult to see why any of these dire
consequences would result from the failure to make standing a
jurisdictional issue.
Certainly, appellate courts could reverse
decisions made by lower courts in excess of their authority as well as
collusive suits. Similarly, the preclusive effect of decisions is also
well within judicial control.
Nevertheless, subsequent Texas
Supreme Court cases have adopted other aspects of federal standing
doctrine, but also without identifying the type of interest or injury
74
required to satisfy Texas's newly adopted standing requirement.
A purported resolution of this problem appears in the Texas
75
Supreme Court's opinion in Austin Nursing Center, Inc. v. Lovato,
73. Id. at 445.
74. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008)
(citing federal cases for the proposition that, for standing, plaintiff s injury must be
"concrete and particularized"); Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001)
("To meet the standing requirements of Article III, '[a] plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief."' (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.
811, 818-19 (1997))); id. ("The United States Supreme Court has 'consistently
stressed that a plaintiff s complaint must establish that he has a "personal stake" in
the alleged dispute' and that the injury suffered is 'concrete and particularized."'
(quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 819)).
75. 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005).
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a case in which the court attempted to reconcile the twin doctrines of
standing and capacity. 76 Citing a well-recognized federal treatise
and earlier cases that attempted to perform the same feat,77 the court
stated that "[t]he issue of standing focuses on whether a party has a
sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a 'justiciable
interest' in its outcome. ' 78 Although the supreme court ultimately
held that a decedent's estate had a "justiciable interest" and standing
to prosecute a survival action because the decedent had a personal
injury claim that became part of the decedent's estate at death, the
court gave no clear guidance about the overall meaning of the term
"justiciable interest., 79 All that we know for sure is that a "justiciable interest" is the kind of interest that is required for a claimant to
go to court. Hence, the definition is completely circular. As explained below, Lovato also provides only a limited reconciliation of
the doctrines of standing and capacity. 80
More recently, the Texas Supreme Court has confused the
merits of common law claims with the concept of jurisdictional
standing. In Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Forth, a policyholder sued her
insurer for settling her medical bills "in what the insured considered
to be an arbitrary and unreasonable manner." 81 Although Forth
sought no damages in her petition, she claimed that Allstate had not
paid so-called Personal Injury Protection benefits in compliance with
her insurance policy, which required payment of "reasonable
expenses incurred for necessary medical and funeral services." 2 She
sought an injunction requiring Allstate to conduct an honest review
76. The relationship of standing and capacity is the subject of Part IV, infra.
77. See Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659,
661 (Tex. 1996) ("A plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved

regardless of whether it is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it
has the legal authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in
the controversy.").
78. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d at 848 (quoting 6A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1559, at 441 (2d ed. 1990)); id. ("A
plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is
acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to

act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy." (quoting
Nootsie, Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 662)).

79. Id. at 850.
80. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
81. 204 S.W.3d 795, 795-96 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
82. Forth v. Allstate Indem. Co., 151 S.W.3d 732, 737-38 (Tex. App.Texarkana 2004), rev'd 204 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2006).
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of her "actual charges without using [an] automatic computer
reductionprogram" and to ultimately "c6mpensate her for lost policy
benefits." , 3 In other words, Forth's claim was for breach of contract,
but she sought only declaratory and injunctive relief rather than
damages. 84 The Texarkana Court of Appeals ruled that Forth had
standing because "[a]nything less than the payment of a reasonable
amount of [medical] expenses [resulting from a motor vehicle
accident] would result in a distinct injury to Forth-that is, receiving
less than the sums for which she contracted., 85 On further appeal,
the Texas Supreme Court summarily reversed the court of appeals
because Forth had not suffered a threatened or actual injury resulting
from the manner in which Allstate settled her claim.8 6 Thus, Forth
had no standing and the trial court had no jurisdiction.
The real question is whether the Texarkana Court of Appeals
and the Texas Supreme Court should have regarded this issue as a
problem with the substantive merits of Forth's claims against
Allstate rather than a jurisdictional problem. What the courts should
have said is that Forth had standing to sue Allstate for breach of
contract, but Allstate did not breach the contract because it satisfied
its policy obligations and Forth suffered no legal injury. Allstate's
plea to the trial court's jurisdiction should have been overruled
because the problem with Forth's claim should not have been
regarded as a jurisdictional problem. It was a problem concerning
the merits of her claim that should have been addressed in a motion
for summary judgment, or in a conventional trial on the merits, not
by a plea to the jurisdiction.
In another recent case, the Texas Supreme Court again
equated the existence of a cause of action with the plaintiffs'

83. Id. at 734-35 (alteration in original).
84. The court of appeals explains that this novel strategy was designed to

obtain certification of a class claim on behalf of other policyholders. Id. at 734
n. 1.
85. Id. at 738.
86. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Forth, 204 S.W.3d 795, 796 (Tex. 2006) ("Forth

does not claim that she has any unreimbursed, out-of-pocket medical expenses.
She does not assert that these providers withheld medical treatment as a result of
Allstate reducing their bills, or threatened to sue her for any deficiency, or
harassed her in any other manner. Moreover, Forth has no exposure in the future
because limitations has now run on the medical claims. From all appearances, her
medical providers have accepted the amount Allstate paid them without complaint,
thereby satisfying Allstate's obligation under the policy.").
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standing to litigate a common law claim. 87 In that case, a resident of
Kingsville and a nonprofit association brought a declaratory
judgment action against a conservation district concerning rates
charged to the City of Kingsville under a contract between the
district and the City of Kingsville, allegedly made to directly benefit
Kingsville residents. The plaintiffs claimed that the rates charged
under the contract were "excessive and discriminatory, causing
Kingsville rate payers to bear a disproportionate percentage of
operating expenses" compared to others who were also served by the
conservation district. 88 The trial court ruled that neither plaintiff had
standing. The court of appeals determined that the Kingsville
resident had standing as a citizen and taxpayer of the City of
Kingsville. On further appeal, the Texas Supreme Court first concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing as third-partybeneficiaries of the contract under common law principles because
there was nothing in the contract that conferred "donee- or creditorbeneficiary standing upon the plaintiffs to challenge the contract's
terms." 89 The court also applied traditional general standing principles to conclude that neither the resident nor the association had
standing because neither the resident nor any member of the
association had sustained a particularized injury "distinct from that
suffered by the public at large." 90 Again, with respect to the thirdparty-beneficiary claim, what the supreme court should have said is
that the plaintiffs do not have a third-party-beneficiary claim under
the substantive law, not that they had no standing to assert such a
claim. On the other hand, with respect to the denial of the resident's
citizen and taxpayer standing, the court's approach rests on a more
solid foundation under both Texas and federal law.
By treating the issues as jurisdictional ones in Forth and
Lomas, the Texas Supreme Court has implicitly validated the use of
a jurisdictional standing defense wherever a claimant's attempted
common law claim does not constitute a viable cause of action.
Under this approach, standing doctrine expands to the limits of the
claims asserted in the action, and a plea to the jurisdiction can be
used to assert that the claimant has no case, depriving the trial and
appellate courts of jurisdiction over the merits. What is worse,
87.
88.
89.
90.

S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2007).
Id. at 306.
Id. at 307.
Id.

Fall 2008]

STANDING DOCTRINE IN TEXAS

because the problem concerns the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction, it can be raised for the first time on appeal and possibly
at any time thereafter in a collateral attack on the trial court's
judgment.
It is more than mildly ironic that the Texas Supreme Court
has recently abandoned the longstanding doctrine that the requirements of a statutory cause of action, created in derogation of the
common law, are jurisdictional, precisely because "a judgment will
never be considered final if the court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. ' '91 As Chief Justice Tom Phillips's opinion explains,
"the modern direction of policy is to reduce the vulnerability of final
judgments to attack92on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject
matter jurisdiction."

If Texas law has been so thoroughly infused with the idea
that the concept of standing must be addressed in every case, 93 it
would be far better to differentiate cases involving common law
claims, and cases involving statutory rights of action, from cases in
which a particular person or governmental unit brings suit to enforce
public rights or to compel the performance of public duties.
Although the imposition of a standing requirement is
justifiable and even sensible in public rights cases, in the mine run of
conventional litigation it makes no procedural sense to treat the legal
or factual validity of a claim as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
maintenance of the action. If a claimant asserts a common law claim
or a statutory right of action, but the claimant has no such claim
under the law, the absence of a viable claim should not be a
jurisdictional concern for several reasons.
First, it is a very bad idea to treat a claimant's failure to plead
and prove a common law or a statutory claim as a jurisdictional
problem because jurisdictional problems can be raised for the first
91. Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000).

92. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e, at 113
(1982)). Since Dubai Petroleum, the Texas Supreme Court has reinforced the
view that a statutory requirement is not jurisdictional, but merely a substantive
prerequisite to relief, unless the legislative intent so indicates. Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. 2004); Hubenak v. San
Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172, 183-84 (Tex. 2004).
93. See, e.g., Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist.,

46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2001) ("A party must have both standing and capacity to
bring a lawsuit. And while standing as an issue cannot be waived, capacity can
be.").
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time on appeal, thereby bypassing all of the other procedural
prerequisites to raising complaints on appeal.94
Second, claimants in such cases should be regarded as having
a sufficient interest to go to court and to obtain a disposition "on the
merits" if they plead a common law cause of action, even if their
claims are without merit. If unmeritorious claims succeed they are
subject to review on appeal or potentially to other direct attacks.
Third, in such cases there is no benefit to be derived from
complicating the adjudicative process by imposing duplicative
threshold assessments concerning the claimant's standing to be in
court in the first place. Common law actions and actions authorized
by statute require claimants to have a legally cognizable claim under
the substantive law. There is no need for courts to engage in addiassessments of a claimant's right to prosecute such
tional esoteric
95
claims.
Fourth, the characterization of the claimant's failure to plead
or prove a common law or a statutory claim as a jurisdictional
problem may also restrict the jurisdiction of an appellate court to
decide the case as well as the preclusive effect of the ultimate
judgment in the case. Under Texas law, if a trial court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, an appellate court may make no order other than
reversing the trial court's judgment and ordering the case
dismissed. 96 The dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter ju97
risdiction also severely limits the preclusive effect of the judgment.
94. See Mazon Assocs., Inc. v. Comerica Bank, Tex., 195 S.W.3d 800, 801

(Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (raising legal claim version of standing doctrine
for the first time on appeal to avoid liability). But see Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Criaco, 225 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no

pet.) (refusing to consider third-party-beneficiary issue as jurisdictional).
95. Injuries to rights recognized at common law are sufficient for standing
under federal law. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 70.
96. City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1985); see
Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex. 1999) (dismissing plaintiffs claims

for lacking subject matter jurisdiction). Even if the evidence is legally sufficient to
support the claimant's common law or statutory claim, dismissal also appears to be
required if the court of appeals concludes that the evidence is factually insufficient.
See Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Aircraft Network, L.L.C., 213 S.W.3d 455, 460-61,
465-66, 469 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (dismissing

claims because the evidence was factually insufficient).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF JUDGMENTS

§ 20(1)(a) (stating

that a

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not bar another action by the plaintiff on the
same claim); id. cmt. b (stating that rules of issue preclusion do apply to dismissals
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The same analysis should be applied to common law and
statutory claims in actions for declaratory relief.9 8 A claimant must
have a "justiciable interest" in the subject matter of the action to
maintain an action for a declaratory judgment. 99 This means that the
plaintiff must have sustained a "distinct injury" and there must be a
"real controversy" that will be actually determined by the judicial
declaration that is sought.' 0 0 Accordingly, the same analysis that
applies to common law or statutory damage claims should be applied
to declaratory judgment actions that involve the declaration of
common law or statutory rights and duties. In other words, the
inability of a claimant to establish a common law duty or a statutory
right as a basis for obtaining declaratory relief should also not be
regarded as a jurisdictional issue. In contrast, as explained below,
declaratory judgment actions that concern the declaration of public
rights should be evaluated under the same principles applied in other
cases involving the adjudication of public rights.
In cases involving the adjudication of public interests, the
issue is more complex because whether the claimant is a suitable
for want of jurisdiction); see McCarney v. Ford Motor Co., 657 F.2d 230, 233-34
(8th Cir. 1981) (holding that dismissal of suit for lack of standing did not bar
separate action based on same operative facts); Cayer Enters., Inc. v. DiMasi, 852
A.2d 758, 760-61 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction was not a judgment on the merits and did not raise the defense
of res judicata); Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592, 60205 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1991) (holding that a dismissal based on lack of corporate
shareholder's ability to assert one statutory claim did not preclude separate action
on another claim even if arising out of identical set of facts).
98. See Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. 1996) (holding that
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not confer jurisdiction on trial court,
but makes relief available for a cause of action within the court's jurisdiction); see
also Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 37.001-.011 (Vernon 2007) (providing an action for declaratory judgment);
Cobb v. Harrington, 190 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. 1945) (holding that an action for
declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable).
99. Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 163-64 (Tex. 2004); see
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.003(c) (Vernon 2007) (noting that a
court can exercise general power and offer "declaratory relief' to "terminate the
controversy or remove an uncertainty").
100. See Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 163-64 ("A judicial decision reached
without a case or controversy is an advisory opinion, which is barred by the
separation of powers provision of the Texas Constitution."); see also Brown v.
Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001) ("[S]tanding limits subject matter
jurisdiction to cases involving a distinct injury to the plaintiff and 'a real
controversy between the parties."' (citation omitted)).
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public representative must be determined. In public rights litigation,
such a determination may be more sensibly regarded as jurisdictional
under the separation of powers rationale to avoid judicial usurpation
of legislative and executive prerogatives. In addition, the selection
of a suitable person to represent the public interest helps to ensure
the presence of an actual controversy. Thus, in public rights cases,
Texas courts could wholeheartedly embrace the federal injury-in-fact
standard, together with the requirements of causation and
redressability, as a jurisdictional prerequisite. For example, in the
Texas Ass 'n of Business case itself, the specific issue concerned the
association's standing to obtain declaratory relief that an administrative enforcement scheme administered by the Texas Air Control
Board and the Texas Water Commission was unconstitutional.
Because some of the TAB's members had been subjected to civil
penalties assessed by the Air Control Board and the Water
Commission, the court determined that "TAB's members have
standing to sue in their own behalf."''
Further, the court also
reasoned that TAB's allegation that other of its members remained at
substantial risk of penalties was also sufficient to ensure that they
had a sufficient interest in the controversy to have individual
standing. Accordingly, the court held that the association had
"standing to sue on behalf of its members [because] 'its members
' 10 2
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right."
Similarly, in Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal District,
the court held that the appraisal district had a justiciable interest in a
controversy involving the constitutionality of an exemption statute,
not because the statute violated the district's constitutional rights, but
"because it is charged with implementing a statute that it believes
violates the Texas Constitution" which "provides the district with a

101. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tex.
1993).
102. Id. The court also ruled that the interests TAB seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose and that neither the claim nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Id. In
the mid 1990's, the Supreme Court ruled that the first two prongs of associational
standing are constitutional and jurisdictional, but that the third prong (neither the
claim nor relief requested requires participation of individual members) is
prudential. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown
Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 554-58 (1996).

Fall 20081

STANDING DOCTRINE IN TEXAS

of an actual
sufficient stake in this controversy to assure the presence
10 3
controversy that the declaration sought will resolve."'
Cases in which judicial review is sought of an administrative
agency's actions also typically involve the adjudication of public
rights and interests. Such cases squarely present the right of claimants to represent the public interest in approving or disapproving
agency action. In 2004, the Texas Supreme Court resolved a split of
authority in the courts of appeals and held that § 2001.171 of the
Texas Government Code' 0 4 confers a right to judicial review unless
express statutory language prohibits judicial review or "specific
legislative history or other reliable evidence of intent" demonstrates
a "legislative intent to prohibit judicial review." 10 5 Significantly, in
addition to satisfying the other prerequisites for judicial review of
administrative action in contested cases, 1° 6 a party must be

103. 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996); see also Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove
Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 774-75 (Tex. 2005) ("But the school
districts have alleged the very same injury that the appraisal district alleged in
Nootsie and the city in Proctor [v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex. 1998)],
which is that they are being required to implement unconstitutional statutes. And
this is also the same injury that gives the districts standing to complain that local
ad valorem taxes have become a state property tax in violation of article VIII,
section 1-e [of the Texas Constitution].").
104. "A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available
within a state agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision on a contested case
is entitled to judicial review." TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.171 (Vernon 2008);
cf id. § 2001.038 (noting that a declaratory judgment action can be used to
challenge an administrative rule if the rule threatens to impair a "legal right or
privilege of the plaintiff').
105. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc.,
145 S.W.3d 170, 195-99 (Tex. 2004) (disapproving Employees Retirement System
v. Foy, 896 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied), which held
that § 2001.171 is a "procedural" provision which does "not create right to judicial
review where the right does not exist by reason of another statute specifically
granting the right").
106. Under the prudential doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a party must seek
an initial administrative determination of a matter delegated by statute to an
administrative agency. See Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.,
84 S.W.3d 212, 219-21 (Tex. 2002) (distinguishing between primary jurisdiction
and exclusive jurisdiction). In addition, a party must ordinarily exhaust all
available administrative remedies, see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 361-62 (Tex. 2004) ("A requirement of exhaustion
of remedies ensures a decision on the merits by the authority designated to make
it."), unless there is only a pure law question involved in the determination of the
administrative case, cf Cameron Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502
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"aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case."' 0 7 The Texas
Supreme Court has explained that the statutory language requires
that a person must show a "justiciable interest," without providing a
more precise definition.' ° 8 Even more significantly, the Austin
Court of Appeals has held that such an interest or injury "need not
affect 'vested' property rights ... ; the harm may be economic,
recreational, or environmental."' 10 9 This requirement, together with
the remainder of the general test for standing embraced in the Texas
Ass'n of Business case, mirrors the federal injury-in-fact test and
arguably should be regarded as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
maintenance of such actions.
Another type of case in which a private person may bring an
action to redress an injury to the public involves an action to abate a
public nuisance. 11° Although Texas cases are not numerous,
following English practice, a private person may bring an action to
abate a public nuisance, but only if the person had suffered
"particular harm" or a "special injury" differing in kind from the
harm suffered by the general public. 11 Use of the same kind of
injury-in-fact approach used in cases challenging agency action is
also a sensible approach in public nuisance cases.

IV.

RELATIONSHIP OF STANDING TO CAPACITY

The court's elevation of standing to a jurisdictional doctrine
in Texas Ass'n of Business makes it necessary to differentiate

(Tex. 2006) (noting that the pure legal question of the constitutionality of taxing
trailers need not be brought administratively).
107. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.171.
108. Hooks v. Tex. Dep't of Water Res., 611 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. 1981).
109. Tex. Rivers Prot. Ass'n v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n,
910 S.W.2d 147, 151-52 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied) (holding that
persons who owned river-front property, with attendant riparian rights, and
conducted canoe trips on river, had standing to appeal grant of permit allowing
third party to divert water from river).
110. A public nuisance is a condition that amounts to "an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public." Jamail v. Stoneledge
Condo. Owners Ass'n, 970 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(l) (1979)).
111. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmts. f,j).
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between a12party's standing to bring an action and the party's capacity
1
to do SO.
Failure to raise a capacity defense in a sworn pleading during
the pretrial phase of the litigation waives the defense. 1 3 Prior 1 to
14
1993, the same approach applied to a lack of standing defense.
Accordingly, the defenses were harmonious and served the same
salutary procedural objective, the elimination of questions about
whether the right parties are before the trial court by requiring parties
to raise and resolve the problem or by applying procedural waiver
principles if the problem was not raised prior to trial.
There has been considerable confusion in the use of the terms
capacity to sue and standing to sue. 115 The terms blur, for example,
when the challenging party uses the term standing to assert a flaw
that actually is a question of capacity. For example, in Shepherd v.
Ledford, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the right of an heir to
sue on behalf of a decedent's estate as an issue of standing, 116 but
subsequently, in Austin Nursing Center, Inc. v. Lovato, the court
changed its mind and concluded that "the issue is more appropriately
characterized as one of capacity."' 17
Many other courts in Texas and elsewhere have had

considerable difficulty in differentiating between the twin doctrines

112. See Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex.
2005) ("The issue of standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient
relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a 'justiciable interest' in its outcome,
whereas the issue of capacity 'is conceived of as a procedural issue dealing with
the personal qualifications of a party to litigate."' (citations omitted)).
113. See Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d
659, 662 (Tex. 1996) ("Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93(1) requires a party to file
a verified pleading if it argues that 'the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue or
that the defendant has not legal capacity to be sued."' (citation omitted)). Capacity
defenses are of two types under Texas procedural law. First, a plaintiff or a
defendant may lack the capacity to sue or be sued. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(1). A
second type of capacity defense is that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in the
capacity in which he sues, or the defendant is not liable in the capacity in which
the defendant is sued. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(2).
114. Tex. Indus. Traffic League v. R.R. Comm'n, 633 S.W.2d 821, 823
(Tex. 1982) (per curiam).
115. See Lovato, 171 S.W.3d at 848 & n.1, 849-51 (citing 5 WILLIAM V.
DORSANEO III, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 70.06[2] (2005)) (discussing courts'
confusion over the use of capacity to sue and standing to sue).
116. 962 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. 1998).
117. 171 S.W.3dat 851 n.3.
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of standing and capacity. 1 8 Confusion also results because
"capacity to sue" has been defined as a party's "standing to assert or
defend the action before the Court."" 9
Texas law requires verification of two categories of
allegations concerning capacity. 120 The first category of allegations
includes any assertion that the plaintiff lacks the legal capacity to sue
or that the defendant lacks the legal capacity to be sued. 12 1 Actions
may be brought by and against parties only if they actually or legally
exist and are legally capable of being sued. Dead persons, decedents' estates, trusts, infants, and incompetents, for example, lack the
capacity to sue or be sued. 122 This capacity defense is relatively easy
to recognize because it concerns whether the claimant is competent
to prosecute any action on the claimant's own behalf and causes no
particular difficulty.
The second capacity defense, that the plaintiff is not entitled
to recover in the capacity in which the plaintiff sued or that the
defendant is not liable in the capacity in which the defendant was
sued, is much more problematic. 23 In this context, capacityrefers to
118. Id. at 848 n.1 ("Although the parties have argued the issue before us
and below as one of standing, the real issue is Coastal's capacity to sue." (quoting
Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880,
884 (Tex. 2001))); id. ("The capacity addressed in Rule 93(c), Tex. R. Civ. P., is
Light's standing to assert or defend the action before the Court." (quoting Light v.
Wilson, 663 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. 1983))); id. ("Appellants' challenge that
appellee lacks standing is, in actuality, a challenge to appellee's capacity to sue."
(quoting Freedman v. Briarcroft Prop. Owners Inc., 776 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied))).
119. See Light, 663 S.W.2d at 814 ("Light's capacity to be sued is not in
issue, but the merit of the Wilsons' suit was placed in issue by Light's general
denial."); see also Conrad v. Artha Garza Co., 615 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (treating capacity and standing as synonymous).
120. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(1), (2).
121. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(1); see Lovato, 171 S.W.3d at 849 ("[M]inors and
incompetents are considered to be under a legal disability and are therefore unable
to sue or be sued in their individual capacities.").
122. E.g., Lovato, 171 S.W.3d at 849; Ray Malooly Trust v. Juhl, 186
S.W.3d 568, 570 (Tex. 2006); Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ramsey, 740 S.W.2d
3, 4 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied).
123. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(2). The origins of Rule 93(2)'s second capacity
defense are unclear. The capacity defenses first appeared as Article 1265 in the
Revised Civil Statutes of 1879, but no original source is mentioned in the Report
of Commissioners to Revise Laws of Texas appointed under the Act of July 28,
1876. Report of Commissioners to Revise Laws of Texas, reprinted in 6 TEX. L.
REv. 327, 337-42 (1927-1928). Although the origins of the first capacity defense
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the authority of the party to assert or defend the particular action that
is before the court, such as the legal authority of a personal representative to prosecute a decedent's cause of action or the legal
trustee to enforce payment obligations
authority of a bankruptcy
24
owed to the debtor. 1

The distinction between the second capacity defense and the
defense that a claimant lacks standing is frequently difficult to
identify because both of the defenses contend that the claimant is the
wrong person to bring the action. The difficulty is reflected in the
interpretation of the second capacity defense that is expressed in a
the Texas Supreme
line of Texas cases usually identified 1with
25
Schoellkopf
v.
Court's opinion in Pledger
In that case, Pledger brought suit against Hunt and
Schoellkopf for fraud and tortious interference. 126 The jury returned
1 27
a verdict for Pledger and judgment was rendered on the verdict.
On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment, holding that the causes of action asserted by Pledger
belonged to Midway Aircraft Sales, Inc., a corporation in which
Pledger, Schoellkopf, and Hunt were shareholders. 128 The Dallas
Court reasoned that the Schoellkopfs had not waived this defense by
failing to file a verified denial of Pledger's capacity to prosecute the
corporate cause of action against them because Pledger was "not
suing in any capacity other than his own," and Pledger did not
establish that he suffered any damages.' 29 The Texas Supreme Court
reversed.' 30 The supreme court explained that the appellate court's
holding that "Rule 93(2) applies only when a party is seeking
can be identified by referencing common law and Code pleading rules that have

been carried forward into Rule 9(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
93(2) has no exact counterpart as a capacity defense in the federal rulebook. As
originally promulgated, both capacity defenses concerned objection to the
plaintiffs capacity only. In contrast, Rule 93 extended the requirements to pleas
questioning the capacity either of plaintiffs or defendants. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93.
124. E.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, 991 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1999, pet. denied); Shiffers v. Estate of Ward, 762 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
125. 762 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam).
126. Id. at 145.
127. Id.
128. Schoellkopf v. Pledger (Schoellkopf 1), 739 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.Dallas 1987), rev'd, 762 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1988).
129. Id. at 921-22.
130. Pledger, 762 S.W.2d at 145.
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recovery in a representative capacity" was too narrow an
interpretation. 131 Instead the supreme court ruled that "Rule 93(2)
requires that a verified plea be filed anytime the record does not
affirmatively demonstrate the plaintiffs or defendant's right to bring
suit or be sued in whatever capacity he is suing. Its application is not
limited to cases32 of representative capacity only. The rule means just
'
what it says."'
If Pledger had been seeking damages for Midway, as its
representative, it could have been much easier to accept the supreme
court's per curiam decision because the issue would clearly be
"authority to act for Midway." But there is no question that the court
went further by not limiting the rule's application to cases of
representative capacity, presumably to preclude technical arguments
from being made about whether the right parties are before the court
when it is too late in the litigation process to correct the problem, at
least without granting a new trial.
Thus, in the absence of a sworn denial of capacity, the
claimant's ownership of the claim is established. 33 The ownership
of the claim is a question of capacity, not one of the elements of the
plaintiffs claim, and certainly not a question of jurisdictional
standing. The Texas Supreme Court's per curiam opinion flatly
rejects the court of appeals' reasoning that "[t]he burden is on the
plaintiff to prove the elements of his claim, including his ownership
1 34
of it.
A large number of cases have followed the court's
35
interpretation of the second capacity defense. 1
131.

Id. at 146.

132.
133.

Id. (citation omitted).
See Schoellkopfv. Pledger (SchoellkopfI), 778 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex.

App.-Dallas 1989) (treating Midway's claim as in issue, but not Pledger's
ownership of the claim).
134. Schoellkopf I, 739 S.W.2d at 921 ("The defendant is not burdened with
disproving that element of the plaintiff's claim.").
135. See, e.g., Swinnea v. ERI Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 236 S.W.3d 825, 833
(Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, no pet.) ("A party has capacity when it has the legal

authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the
controversy."); Landry's Seafood House-Addison, Inc. v. Snadon, 233 S.W.3d

430, 433-34 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. filed) (failure to raise issue of
ownership of claim for amounts due under commercial lease by verified denial
waives complaint); King-Mays v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 194 S.W.3d 143, 145
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied) ("A challenge to privity is a capacity issue,

not standing, and requires compliance with rule 93."); Spurgeon v. Coan & Elliot,
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The Texas Supreme Court has also held that if a defendant is
sued individually along with the defendant's corporation and there is
no verified denial of individual liability, the individual's capacity to
be sued is admitted. Accordingly, the individual defendant may be

held liable in either an individual or a36 corporate capacity if there is
evidence to support such a judgment.'
Under the analysis made in these cases, a failure to deny that
the plaintiff has sued in the right capacity or that the defendant has
been sued in the right capacity obviates the need to prove the
plaintiffs ownership of the claim or the basis, like alter ego, for the
defendant's liability on the claim, but not the need to prove the
elemental validity of the claim itself.

180 S.W.3d 593, 597-98 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet.) (contention that
breach of contract claim was owned by another corporation was waivable capacity
issue); Prostok v. Browning, 112 S.W.3d 876, 921 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003) ("A
challenge to who owns the claim raises the issue of capacity, not standing, and
requires compliance with Rule 93."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 165 S.W.3d
336 (Tex. 2005); Willis v. Donnelly, 118 S.W.3d 10, 49 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003) ("Whether a stockholder may recover damages personally for a
wrong done to the corporation is an argument about capacity-that is, whether the
stockholder has legal authority."), rev'd on other grounds, 199 S.W.3d 262 (Tex.
2006); see CHCA E. Houston, L.P. v. Henderson, 99 S.W.3d 630, 632-34 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding that a complaint that plaintiff
was not party to lease was waivable "capacity" or "defect of parties" issue); AU
Pharm., Inc. v. Boston, 986 S.W.2d 331, 340 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no
pet.) (holding that a challenge to ownership of claim is challenge to capacity, not
standing); Van Voorhies v. Hudson, 683 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex. App.-Houston
[ 14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that a verified plea is required to assert
that suit brought by appellant individually should have been brought by
corporation of which he was stockholder and president).
136. W.O.S. Constr. Co. v. Hanyard, 684 S.W.2d 675, 676 (Tex. 1985); see
Light v. Wilson, 663 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. 1983) ("Light's capacity to be sued is
not in issue, but the merit of the Wilsons' suit was placed in issue by Light's
general denial."); Beacon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 799 S.W.2d 390, 395 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied) (citing Pledger, 762 S.W.2d 145, 145-46
(Tex. 1988)) (holding that verified capacity defense must be alleged where policy
sued upon was issued by a different insurer); Butler v. Joseph's Wine Shop, Inc.,
633 S.W.2d 926, 929-30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.)
(holding that individual liability may be found in absence of swom denial without
having to find corporation is alter ego of named defendant); see also Union Nat'l
Bank of Little Rock v. Moriarty, 746 S.W.2d 249, 254-55 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1987, writ denied) (holding that the contention that proper party is corporate
party's subsidiary must be raised by verified plea under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 93(7)).
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Other cases hold, however, that a contention that the cause of
action should have been brought by another person raises a question
of standing, not merely an issue of capacity, 37 or, perhaps,
"something else."'' 38 Thus, a contention that a claim should have
been brought against a "separate and distinct corporate entity" has
been held to be a claim of mistaken identity that involved the merits
of the plaintiffs' tort claims, not a capacity defense.1 39 A defendant's
contention that it is not liable because it is not a party to the contract
that is the basis of the action involves the merits of the plaintiffs
1 40
cause of action, not the mistaken legal capacity of the defendant.
These cases are difficult to reconcile with the Texas Supreme
Court's opinions in Pledgerv. Schoellkopf,14' Light v. Wilson, 142 and
W.O.S. Construction Co. v. Hanyard.143 In an attempt at clarification
of the distinction between capacity and standing, in Nootsie the
Texas Supreme Court subsequently explained that "[a] plaintiff has
137. Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 249-52, 255-56 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (holding that former partner who sold interest in
partnership to another party had no standing or capacity to prosecute partnership's
claims); see also Gonzalez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 181 S.W.3d 386, 391-93
(Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied) (holding that limited partners lack
standing to sue for the partnership and a limited partnership not involved in the
original transaction lacked standing, even though many of the same partners were
involved in both partnerships); Pape Equip. Co. v. I.C.S., Inc., 737 S.W.2d 397,
404 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that a
challenge to plaintiffs right to bring claim not effectively assigned is treated as
issue of standing, not capacity to sue); Cozad v. Roman, 570 S.W.2d 558, 562
(Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (holding that even though the
defendant's pleas questioned the plaintiff's standing, defendant had not raised
capacity and therefore the capacity pleading rules did not apply).
138. Henderson, 99 S.W.3d at 632 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005,
no pet.).
139. Trailways, Inc. v. Clark, 794 S.W.2d 479, 488-89 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied) (holding that suit was mistakenly directed against parent
corporation instead of its wholly-owned subsidiary).
140. C & C Partners v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 783 S.W.2d 707, 72122 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied) (holding that privity of contract is
essential element of recovery that may be tried under general denial); John Chezik
Buick Co. v. Friendly Chevrolet Co., 749 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, writ denied); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(7) (requiring verification to deny
plaintiff's allegations that defendant executed written instrument on which action
is founded).
141. 762 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1988).
142. 663 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1983).
143. 684 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1985).
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standing when the person is personally aggrieved" and therefore has
a justiciable interest in the controversy, "regardless of whether the
person is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has
the legal authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable
interest in the controversy."' 44 More recently, in Lovato the supreme
court explained further that the issue of standing focuses on whether
a party has a "justiciable interest" in the outcome of a case. 145 In
contrast, capacity means a party's right to come into court to pursue
the claim. 146 By themselves, these linguistic formulations are more
mysterious than they are helpful, particularly because both Nootsie
and Lovato involve Rule 93(1)'s first capacity defense ("legal
capacity to sue") not Rule 93(2)'s second capacity defense ("plaintiff
is not entitled to sue in the capacity in which he sues"). Neither case
provides guidance on the proper interpretation of Rule 93(2)'s
second capacity defense and its relationship to standing doctrine or
other defenses.
The most sensible way to reconcile the Pledger v.
Schoellkopf line of cases with cases treating the ownership of a claim
as a question of standing would be to recognize that a person can
have capacity to prosecute a claim if the person has the legal
authority to do so under a contract or a statute or is so closely related
to the legal owner of the claim that legal authority should be
presumed and regarded as the legal equivalent of ownership, in the
absence of a denial of capacity. Under this approach, if the claim
actually belongs to one person, such as a corporation, but the action
is filed by another person, such as a corporate shareholder or a
related company, the issue should be whether the claimant is
authorized to prosecute the claim on behalf of the actual owner. This
is a waivable capacity problem, not a jurisdictional standing problem. 147 In such cases, the requirement of standing is satisfied by the
interest of the person that actually does own the right sought to be
enforced in the action; the capacity requirement is satisfied by the
144.
661 (Tex.
145.
2005).
146.
147.

Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659,
1996).
Austin Nursing Center, Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848-49 (Tex.
Id.
See Pledger, 762 S.W.2d at 145-46 (holding that plaintiff waived

ability to contest capacity of a shareholder who brought action (when it actually
belonged to company) by not complying with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
93(2)).
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presumed authority of the plaintiff to enforce the claim. 148 But, if the
action is filed by a person that is completely unrelated to the
corporation at the time the action is commenced,
there may be a
49
problem.1
capacity
a
as
well
as
problem
standing
There are several good reasons for treating the presumed
ownership of a claim as a waivable issue of capacity. First, in a large
number of cases the "wrong plaintiff' problem probably could be
obviated if the issue was raised during the pretrial phase of the
litigation. In several reported cases, corporate claims have been filed
and prosecuted to judgment by controlling shareholders whose right
to sue was not challenged until trial by motions for instructed verdict
or motions for judgment n.o.v. complaining that the evidence was
legally insufficient to show that the shareholder was the rightful
owner of the claim.150 Under these circumstances, the defect in
parties could have been obviated by an assignment or by the joinder
of the corporate claimant. Some of these courts have sensibly
reasoned that in the absence of a sworn denial of capacity, "[j]ust
how [the individual claimant] acquired the cause of action is not
before [the] Court. ' ' 151 Second, in dealing with the similar problem
148. See Lovato, 171 S.W.3d at 848-54 (holding that estate had standing but
no capacity to sue and that personal representative had capacity to represent
estate).
149. See Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 249-52 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (holding that plaintiffs who were not parties to a
distribution agreement had no standing to sue based on harm allegedly suffered
when a consolidation agreement fell through); cf CHCA E. Houston, L.P. v.
Henderson, 99 S.W.3d 630, 632-34 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no
pet.) ("Successors-in-interest or affiliated corporations are different parties, not
different 'capacities' of one another. And the only 'defect of parties' is an
allegation that one of them should be dismissed. But the Texas Supreme Court has
approved the application of Rule 93 to other situations involving confusion among
parties that are separate entities.").
150. Van Voorhies v. Hudson, 683 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.) ("Martin Van Voorhies testified he is one of
two stockholders and the president of Martin Van Voorhies Inc."); Biggs v.
Garrett, 651 S.W.2d 342, 343-44 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ) ("[E]vidence
reflects that Robert L. Garrett was the president and major stockholder of Garrett
Building Center, Inc."); see also Sam Kane Beef Processors, Inc. v. Manning, 601
S.W.2d 93, 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) ("Mr. Manning
owns the business.").
151. Van Voorhies, 683 S.W.2d at 810-11; see also Biggs, 651 S.W.2d at
343 (noting that defendant had waived "any legitimate complaint" even though
there was no showing of how the plaintiff acquired the cause of action).
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of a party's failure to join a party needed for just adjudication, 152 a
defendant waives the absence of the joinder of a person needed for
by not raising the person's absence at, or preferably
just adjudication
53
trial.1
before,
Third, although the federal courts treat the wrong plaintiff
problem a little differently, federal practice also requires a defendant
to raise an objection to the plaintiffs right to make a claim before
trial. Federal Rule 17(a) provides that an action must be prosecuted
in the name of "the real party in interest."'' 54 This requirement,
which is not contained in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, serves
the same function as Texas Rule 93(2), which itself has no exact
counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 55 For example,
in Ensley v. Cody Resources, Inc., Ensley and his wife incorporated
Ensley Properties, Inc. (EPI) as a vehicle for the operation of a
consulting firm for petroleum-related businesses. 156 EPI/Ensley
worked for Cody Resources on a deal to acquire Ultramar, but a
dispute arose about compensation. Ultimately, Ensley sued Cody
Resources for damages, alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit,
and fraudulent inducement. At the close of Ensley's case in chief,
Cody Resources moved for judgment as a matter of law on all three
claims, claiming that Ensley had no standing to recover damages in
his individual capacity for services rendered by EPI during the
Ultramar transaction. 157 The trial court deferred ruling on the
motion, and the claims were tried to a jury, which found for Ensley
on the quantum meruit claim awarding substantial damages. After
the court rendered judgment on the verdict, Cody Resources renewed
its Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the trial
152.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 39.

153.

See Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 162-63 (Tex. 2004)

("We appreciate the risk that, unless each homeowner is joined in one suit,
Northglen may be subject to inconsistent judgments. Northglen's dilemma, however, is a product of its own inaction. Northglen could have sought relief at trial

by urging the court, among other things, to abate the case, join absent
homeowners, or grant special exceptions." (citations omitted)).
154.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 17(a).

155. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (discussing the requirements for capacity to
sue or be sued).
156. 171 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1999).
157. Ensley, 171 F.3d at 318; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (providing the

motion for judgment as a matter of law); Whelan v. Abell, 953 F.2d 663, 671-72
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that queries concerning standing and real parties in
interest overlap).
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court initially granted. 118 On reconsideration, the trial court held that
the defendant's objection was not about standing, at least not in a
jurisdictional sense. Rather, the court found it was a real-party-ininterest objection that Cody Resources had waived by not raising it
before trial. 159 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Ensley. The court of
appeals assumed that the cause of action belonged to EPI, but held
that notwithstanding the fact that Texas law provides that a
shareholder may not sue for a corporation's injury, the waivable realparty-in-interest objection governed the outcome.1 60 Because Cody
Resources did not object until after Ensley's case in chief, the
objection came too late and was waived.161
To recapitulate, if the issue is the authority of a claimant to
prosecute a claim that arguably belongs to another person, the
problem should be regarded as a waivable capacity problem, not an
issue of jurisdictional standing that can be raised for the first time on
appeal. Similarly, to preclude defendants from making dilatory ar158. Ensley, 171 F.3dat 318.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 318-19 (citing Wingate v. Hajdik, 795 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex.
1990)).
161. Id. at 320 ("The real issue is not whether there is jurisdiction, but the
prudential limitation on our exercise of jurisdiction over a jus tertii/third party
plaintiff. Although the cases Cody cites refer to a lack of standing as a
shareholder, not one holds that the inquiry is jurisdictional or that the objection
may not be waived.... Cody's standing objection is a prudential limitation that
constitutes an objection to the real party in interest under FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).").
This approach is also followed in courts in the 2nd, 9th, 10th, D.C., and Federal
Circuits. Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaaneelhouders In
Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int'l B.V. v. Schreiber, 407 F.3d 34, 45 (2d Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in holding that
the real-party-in-interest defense had not been waived although the real-party-ininterest defense was not raised until "after more than three years of litigation");
Dunmore v. United States, 358 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
the real-party-in-interest requirement is a prudential limitation); Hefley v. Jones,
687 F.2d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in considering the real-party-in-interest defense waived when
defendant tried to raise it sixteen days before trial); Richardson v. Edwards, 127
F.3d 97, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the real-party-in-interest defense was
waived when made on appeal because the defense was not raised "with reasonable
promptness"); Aldridge v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 387, 389-90 (2004) (holding
that the real-party-in-interest requirement is merely a prudential limitation, leaving
it in the court's discretion to determine whether the defense should be considered
waived).
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guments about whether the right plaintiff has prosecuted a claim,
after the conclusion of the pretrial phase of the litigation (i.e. during
trial or after receipt of the verdict), ownership of the claim itself, or
at least the claimant's authority to act for the true owner, should be
established unless challenged by a timely denial of capacity under
Rule 93(2) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

V.

CONCLUSION

If federal standing doctrine is here to stay, several very
muddled procedural and jurisdictional issues need to be resolved.
First, clear distinctions must be drawn between the types of
cases in which a claimant's standing, defined generally as the right to
bring suit and prosecute a claim, is regarded as jurisdictional and the
types of cases in which it is not. As explained in Part III of this
Article, it is unnecessary and unhelpful to superimpose an external
standing analysis on a claimant's ability to bring suit in cases
involving common law claims or statutory rights of action. In these
cases, the issue of standing is either indistinguishable from the merits
of the claims being asserted or superfluous. No additional evaluation
and assessment of the claimant's injury is needed because the
elemental contours of the common law or statutory claims provide
sufficient guidance about the nature of the legal interest and the legal
injury that is being redressed. Regardless of whether damages or
declaratory relief is sought, in such cases the claimant should be
regarded as having a justiciable interest.
Second, it is a particularly bad idea for standing in common
law and statutory actions to be regarded as jurisdictional, thereby
allowing complaints about a claimant's failure to prove the claim to
be made for the first time on appeal. In contrast, in public rights
cases, a more refined analysis is required. Unless a statute confers
standing to bring the action, in public rights cases, some kind of
"particularized injury" analysis is consistent with traditional Texas
law and makes good sense. In public rights cases, there may also be
good reason to regard the issue as jurisdictional, rather than
prudential, to ensure that the courts do not usurp legislative or
executive prerogatives. In such cases, it arguably also makes sense
for Texas courts to wholeheartedly embrace federal standing
doctrine.
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Third, the nature of the interest or injury required for
standing must be clearly distinguished from the issue of capacity,
which has always been regarded as a waivable procedural matter. A
person's competence to prosecute a claim should be regarded as a
waivable procedural defect primarily because the problem can be
remedied by the selection of a suitable personal representative for the
real party in interest. Similarly, a person's authority to bring suit and
prosecute a claim that may belong to another party should also be
treated as a waivable procedural issue rather than an issue of
standing. Under this analysis, the twin doctrines of standing and
capacity can and should be sensibly harmonized.

